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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT? HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
BETWEEN NON-STATE ACTORS 
Simon Baughen* 
 
Every December, a big Coca-Cola poster goes up on Hotwell Road in 
Bristol, United Kingdom, near where I live. Within a few days, without 
fail, it will have been defaced with reference to the “Killer Coke” 
campaign.1 Then every year, I tell my daughters about the latest 
developments in the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”);2 in 2013, there was a lot 
to tell. In this Article, I want to develop the theme of human rights 
treaties, which forms Chapter Six of Professor Joel P Trachtman’s book 
The Future of International Law: Global Government.3 I will also look at 
the potential horizontal effect of customary international law in the 
human rights field. The Coke case was an ATS case involving alleged 
complicity of a Coca-Cola licensee in violation of human rights in 
Colombia4—a claim in a national court by a private party, against a 
private party, based on a violation of customary international law. I want 
to consider whether such claims are purely a U.S. phenomenon, whether 
such claims are likely to fade in the future given the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel,5 or whether such claims outline the 
                                                                                                                             
* Professor of Shipping Law, International Institute of Shipping and Trade Law, 
Swansea University. 
1. Ray Rogers, Killer Coke, THE CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER COKE, 
http://www.killercoke.org/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
2. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). Until 2004, the Alien Tort Statute was known 
as the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”). Id. 
3. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
GLOBAL GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 
4. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–49 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
5. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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basis of a new, universal form of civil liability based on violations of 
customary international law. 
I would like to start with a brief look at the ways in which 
international law can creep into domestic courts, such as those of the 
United Kingdom. First, it may form the basis of claims by private parties 
against states through regional human rights treaties. The Human 
Rights Act of 1998 provides: “It is unlawful for a public authority to act in 
a way which is incompatible with a [c]onvention right.”6 Further, it 
allows violations of the European Convention on Human Rights to form 
the basis of proceedings against a United Kingdom public authority.7 
Examples of such actions have been claims for judicial review in Al-
Skeini v. U.K.8 and R. (on the application of Smith) v. Oxfordshire 
Assistant Deputy Coroner,9 and for damages in Smith v. M.O.D.10 All 
claims arose out of British military involvement in the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. 
Second, private parties may also obtain rights against states 
pursuant to the provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties,11 which 
contain investor-state arbitration provisions. These treaties between 
states allow each contracting state’s investors the direct right to arbitrate 
against the other state in respect of violations of the state obligations 
contained in the treaty. It is common for such treaties to refer to those 
obligations of states to aliens that are established under customary 
international law, such as the prohibition on expropriation of property.12 
Under investor-state arbitral provisions, violations of such norms can 
allow the affected investor a direct right to arbitrate and seek 
                                                                                                                             
6. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6(1) (Eng.). 
7. Id. at §§ 6, 7, 8. 
8. Al-Skeini v. U.K., (2011) 53 EHRR 18. 
9. R v. Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner, [2010] UKSC 29, [2011] 1 A.C. 1. 
10. Smith v. M.O.D., [2013] UKSC 41, [2013] 3 W.L.R. 69. 
11. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (describing how private parties obtain rights against the U.S., Canada, 
and Mexico). 
12. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Arg.-U.K., art. 5, Dec. 11, 1990, 32 I.L.M. 
(1994), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201765/volume-
1765-i-30682-english.pdf. This investment treaty provides: 
Investments of investors of either [c]ontracting [p]arty shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) in the territory of the 
other [c]ontracting [p]arty except for a public purpose related to the internal needs 
of that [c]ontracting [p]arty on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, 
adequate[,] and effective compensation . . . . 
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compensation from the culpable state, without having to seek 
compensation through state-to-state proceedings.13 
Third, international law may creep into tort suits against states 
through a public policy exception. In Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi 
Airways Company, the House of Lords considered the application of the 
double actionability rule of conflicts of law that applied at the time of the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.14 Kuwait Airways sued Iraqi Airways in 
conversion following the transfer of its air-fleet by Resolution 369 of Iraqi 
law.15 Applying that resolution would mean that the suit would not be 
actionable under Iraqi law and the claim before the English court would 
therefore fail. However, by a 3-2 majority, the House of Lords disregarded 
Resolution 369 on grounds of public policy because it was found to be a 
violation of international law. A national court could decline to give effect 
to legislation or the acts of a foreign state where that state was in 
violation of international law—namely, Iraqi Resolution 369—that 
purported to dissolve Kuwait Airways and transfer its assets to Iraqi 
Airways.16 
Subsequently, claimants have raised public policy arguments in 
English cases, but with less success. In Apostolides v. Orams,17 
purchasers of property in the Turkish-controlled sector of Cyprus 
appealed an order of the English High Court registering judgments from 
the Nicosia district court in the Republic of Cyprus in favor of the original 
property owner who was dispossessed in 1974, pursuant to Article 34(1) 
                                                                                                                             
13. See The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 94 
(Sept. 13); Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J 3 (Feb. 5). 
14. Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 A.C. 883. 
15. The House of Lords had previously held, by a 3-2 majority, that although Iraqi 
Airways Company enjoyed state immunity for its acts of taking the aircrafts and removing 
them from Kuwait to Iraq as directed by the Government of Iraq, its retention and use of 
the aircraft after Resolution 369 came into force were not acts done in the exercise of 
sovereign authority and thus were not covered by state immunity. See Kuwait Airways 
Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (No.1), [1995] 1 WLR 1147. 
16. See dicta of Lord Cross in Oppenheimer v. Cattermole (Inspector of Taxes), [1976] 
A.C. 249 (H.L.) [278] in relation to recognition of a Nazi law of 1941 removing citizenship 
and property from German Jews who had left Germany:  
But what we are concerned with here is legislation which takes away without 
compensation from a section of the citizen body singled out on racial grounds all 
their property on which the state passing the legislation can lay its hands and, in 
addition, deprives them of their citizenship. In my mind, a law of this sort 
constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country 
ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all. 
 
Id. 
17. Apostolides v. Orams, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 9; see Adeline Chong, Transnational 
Public Policy in Civil and Commercial Matters, 128 L.Q.R. 88 (2012). 
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of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
registration of the judgments, noting that the circumstances in which an 
English court would not enforce a judgment on the ground that it is 
contrary to international law were extremely narrow.18 Unlike the 
position in Kuwait Airways, there was no suggestion that clear-cut rules 
of international law required non-recognition in the present case, but 
rather that the climate for a political settlement would be impaired by 
action recognizing Cypriot judgments.  
Recently, in Mutua v. Foreign and Commonwealth Office,19 the 
claimants were Kenyans who were tortured during the Mau insurgency 
in the 1950s and argued that a violation of the jus cogens20 prohibition 
against torture trumped the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1980. Mr. 
Justice McCombe addressed this argument as follows: 
However, I accept the defendant’s submission that the jus cogens of the 
prohibition of torture in international law adds nothing to the seriousness 
of the allegations which the court naturally takes into account in 
considering ‘all the circumstances of the case’ under section 33 of the Act. 
So far as international law’s ‘deprecation’ of limitation periods in respect 
of torture is concerned, I can find no customary rule of international law 
that prohibits the imposition in domestic law of just rule of limitation in 
civil actions.21 
 However, he went on to hold that the claims were still in time 
because of section 33 of the Act.  
 Fourth, international law may come into suits by private parties 
against private parties through domestic courts. International law 
may be involved through the implementation of treaties which 
directly affect the rights and obligations of non-state parties. For 
                                                                                                                             
18.  Apostolides v. Orams, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 9, [54]. 
19. Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [2012] EWHC 2678 (Q.B.), (2012) 162 
N.L.J. 1291. The claims were settled on June 6, 2013. See The U.K. Regrets Torture and 
Compensates Kenyan Victims After More Than [Fifty] Years, REDRESS (June 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.redress.org/downloads/MauMapressrelease-060613.pdf. 
20. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 defines a 
peremptory (jus cogens) norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of [s]tates as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 20, 1969. 
21 Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [2012] EWHC 2678 (Q.B.) [¶¶ 156–57], 
(2012) 162 N.L.J. 1291. 
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example, the “Oil Pollution Convention,” the 1969 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (the “CLC”), is 
an agreement between states, which is then implemented into 
domestic law, that gives private parties statutory rights to claims 
against other private parties for loss sustained due to marine oil 
pollution.22 An indirect horizontal effect may also occur under 
regional human rights treaties as with the development of the law 
relating to privacy in the U.K. The Human Rights Act of 1998, section 
6(1) provides: “It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right,” and section 6(3)(a) 
provides that this includes a court or tribunal. This has had an effect 
on how the courts of the U.K., as public authorities, apply the law of 
tort.23 
 However, what I want to look at is the situation where there are 
no such treaties. Can customary international law24 on human rights 
have a horizontal effect and form the basis of an action by one private 
citizen against another? Plaintiffs will have to bring these suits 
through national courts because there is no international equivalent 
of the International Criminal Court for civil claims. Customary 
international law in itself does not create actionability. Rather, it 
                                                                                                                             
22. In the U.K., this has been done through Chapters III and IV of the Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1995, which implements the 1992 Protocol to the CLC. See Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1995, c. 21 (U.K.). 
23. In particular, the development of a right to privacy based on article 8 of the 
ECHR. See Campbell v. MGN, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457. In Campbell, Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead stated: 
The time has come to recognise that the values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 are 
now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence. As Chief Justice Lord Woolf 
has said, the courts have been able to achieve this result by absorbing the rights 
protected by articles 8 and 10 into this cause of action: A v. B PLC [2003] Q.B, 195, 
202, para[graph] 4. Further, it should now be recognised that for this purpose these 
values are of general application. The values embodied in articles 8 and 10 are as 
much applicable in disputes between individuals or between an individual and a 
non-governmental body such as a newspaper as they are in disputes between 
individuals and a public authority. 
 
Id. 
24. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003) (defining 
international human rights law as being “composed only of those rules that [s]tates 
universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern”). 
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creates binding norms which can then enter domestic legal orders 
that incorporate customary international law.25 
America Leads the Way: Customary International Law as a Cause of 
Action in the Federal Courts of the United States 
 
I now turn my attention to the United States where there has been a 
torrent of such claims coming through the federal courts since 1980. The 
reason for this is the Alien Tort Statute of 1789, which provides: “The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien26 for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”27 The statute was rediscovered in 1980 in 
                                                                                                                             
25. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Per 
Judge Edwards:  
As a result, the law of nations never has been perceived to create or define the civil 
actions to be made available by each member of the community of nations; by 
consensus, the states leave that determination to their respective municipal laws. 
Indeed, given the existing array of legal systems within the world, a consensus 
would be virtually impossible to reach—particularly on the technical accoutrements 
to an action-and it is hard even to imagine that harmony ever would characterize 
this issue.  
 
Id. 
26. The ATS grant of jurisdiction is limited to claims by aliens. On March 12, 1992, 
President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 
(hereinafter “TVPA”) which provides in section 2:  
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any 
foreign nation[—](1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be 
liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial 
killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal 
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful 
death.  
 
Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1991). This allows claims for 
torture to be made by any person, of whatever nationality. Claims under the Act are subject 
to an exhaustion of remedies requirement and to a ten-year limitation period. The reference 
to acting under “authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” would preclude suits being 
brought against U.S. officials, unless they were acting under foreign law. 
27.  A claim for a violation of a treaty of the United States under the ATS will only be 
possible if the treaty is self-executing. In Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 374–76 (7th Cir. 
2005), such a claim was advanced in relation to an alleged violation of article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the “Vienna Convention”), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. The Seventh Circuit subsequently reconsidered its opinion and 
decided not to rest subject matter jurisdiction on the ATS, since it was unclear whether the 
treaty violation constituted a “tort,” but, rather, decided that jurisdiction was secure under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 2007).  
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Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, when the appellants, the father and sister of a 
seventeen-year-old Paraguayan man, Joelito, brought an action in the 
Eastern District of New York against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala 
(Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, for wrongfully causing Joelito’s 
death.28 The statute gives jurisdiction only in respect of claims by an 
alien.29 
What does “the law of nations” mean? In Filartiga, the Second Circuit 
held that a rule commands the “general assent of civilized nations” if it is 
to become binding upon them all.30 This was a stringent requirement, but 
one that was satisfied with regards to the prohibition on torture. In 
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, the Second Circuit defined 
“the law of nations” by reference to customary international law that it 
defined as follows: “Customary international law is composed only of 
those rules that states universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of 
legal obligation and mutual concern.”31 The plaintiffs argued that there 
were rules creating rights to life and health and a prohibition on intra-
national pollution.32 The court rejected all three of these as representing 
norms of customary international law.33  
The federal courts have held that the following claims meet the 
standard for recognition of a norm of customary international law set out 
in Filartiga and Flores: forced labor,34 crimes against humanity,35 war 
crimes,36 torture, extrajudicial killing, pollution in breach of the 1982 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,37 non-consensual medical 
experimentation,38 cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,39 and 
genocide.40 However, the federal courts have held that the following do 
                                                                                                                             
28.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
29. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1991) (emphasis added).  
30. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
31. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
32. Id. at 254. 
33. Id. at 263–64. 
34. Doe I. v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2002).  
35. Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241–43 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1150–51 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
36. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314–19 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1184–86. 
37. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–63. 
38. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 17, 2002). 
39. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *7–*9 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). 
40. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 326–29.  
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not meet the standard for recognition of a norm of customary 
international law: claims in respect of national pollution,41 trans-
boundary pollution,42 and cultural genocide.43 
The first wave of ATS suits were directed at former state officials.44 
In the United States, the immunity of state officials is determined by the 
common law, and not the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.45 
Under U.S. common law, there are two types of immunity. First, there is 
“Head of State” immunity, which is an absolute immunity for serving 
heads of state and applies even when a claim is made in respect of a 
violation of a jus cogens norm of international law. Second, there is 
“conduct-based” immunity of foreign officials arising out of their official 
acts when in office.46 The Fourth Circuit has held that this immunity 
may not be asserted in respect of private acts or acts involving an alleged 
violation of a jus cogens norm of international law or the commission of 
an international crime—such as torture in Filartiga.47 This jus cogens 
restriction of conduct-based immunity has not been accepted outside the 
U.S., as witnessed by the U.K. decision in Jones v. Saudi Arabia,48 and in 
the ECHR’s decision in Al-Adsani v. U.K. 49 with regards to a civil claim 
against a state or a state official.  
The second wave of ATS suits was directed at non-state actors, 
raising the question of how norms of customary international law that 
proscribe the conduct of states can come to affect private actors.50 The 
                                                                                                                             
41. See Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166–67 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 476–80 (2d Cir. 2002); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper 
Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 254–59 (2d Cir. 2003). 
42.  Amlon Metals v. FMC, 775 F. Supp. 668, 670–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
43. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 168–69 n.3. 
44. Where a suit is made against a state, the ATS is preempted by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 
488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). The preemption applies even where the claim alleges a violation of 
a jus cogens norm of international law. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 
F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992). 
45. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313–16 (2010). The Supreme Court held that a 
foreign official did fall under either § 1603(a), which referred to a “foreign state,” or § 
1603(b), which referred to an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” Id. at 314. 
46. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773–77 (4th Cir. 2012). 
47.  Id. at 776–78. However, the Second Circuit in Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d 
Cir 2009) allowed conduct-based immunity in respect of claims brought under the ATS and 
TVPA against the former Israeli intelligence chief in connection with the bombing of Gaza 
in 2002. 
48. Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270. 
49. Al-Adsani v. U.K., (2002) 34 EHRR 11. 
50. Julian Ku, The Third Wave: the Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105, 105–106 (2005). Ku has identified a third wave of ATS suits 
directed at U.S. officials in connection with abuses allegedly committed during the war on 
terror post 9/11. Id. However, such suits have been dismissed as the U.S. has invoked 
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answer given by the U.S. courts in ATS cases is either through the 
domestic “color of law” jurisprudence under § 1983,51 or through 
international criminal law. The civil liability of non-state actors for 
violations of norms of customary international law was first recognised in 
an ATS suit in 1995, Kadic v Karadzic.52 A non-state actor could incur 
civil liability under customary international law for violating one of the 
handful of norms for which criminal liability could be incurred under 
international law. 53 As well as incurring a primary liability for directly 
violating such a norm, as Karadzic did, a non-state actor could also incur 
a secondary liability for aiding and abetting the violation of such a norm 
by a state actor. In 2002, the majority of the Ninth Circuit in Doe I. v. 
                                                                                                                             
sovereign immunity, and the plaintiffs have failed to show any waiver of immunity. See Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2010). The ATS itself does not provide a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. U.S., 957 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992); see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
Sovereign immunity has also been invoked to dismiss state lawsuits against private 
contractors operating for the U.S. government in Iraq. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 
2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). It was held that during wartime, where a private service contractor is 
integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains command authority, a 
tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in such activities shall be preempted, 
both with regards to ATS claims and tort claims under state law. Id. 
51. “Civil action for deprivation of rights” provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any [s]tate . . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [U.S.] Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). If § 1983 is engaged, the effect is that though the defendant, 
or his or her agents, may have committed the tort, the finding of state involvement in the 
tort will enable an ATS claim to be brought against a non-state actor for a violation of 
customary international law. The more common situation in ATS proceedings is what has 
been described as “reverse state action” where the wrongs have been committed by the 
foreign state and the plaintiff seeks to link the defendant to those violations. See SARAH 
JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 35 (2004). 
52. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–42 (2d Cir. 1995). The norms violated by 
Karadzic were those prohibiting genocide and war crimes. Id. at 242–43. Karadzic also 
violated the norm prohibiting torture. Id. at 245. This, by definition, can only be committed 
by a state actor, but also covered actions by non-recognized states, such as Srpska. 
Alternatively, Karadzic, as a non-state actor, could be liable for torture by reference to 
“color of law” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
53. An example of a non-state actor who incurred such a criminal liability is provided 
by Bruno Tesch who supplied Zyklon B to the Nazi S.S., which was used to kill allied 
POW’s. He was found guilty of aiding and abetting a war crime and was hung in 1946. Trial 
of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N LAW, 
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 93–107 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946). 
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Unocal Corporation,54 decided that a corporate defendant in an ATS suit 
could be liable on the basis of the criminal liability imposed by 
international law on those who aid and abet violations of jus cogens 
norms—namely, the prohibition on forced labor that had evolved from the 
prohibition on slavery. The Ninth Circuit’s decision was vacated in 
February 2003 and an en banc rehearing re-ordered, primarily to clarify 
whether international law or federal tort law was the applicable law for 
an ATS claim.55 However, before the case could be re-heard, the parties 
agreed to a settlement. Since then, aiding and abetting liability has 
formed the basis of most of the claims against corporations that have 
come along in the second wave of ATS cases.56 
In 2004, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,57 considered 
the nature of the statute. The plaintiff alleged that he had been 
unlawfully abducted from Mexico for twenty-four hours to face trial in 
the United States.58 The Supreme Court held that the ATS was 
jurisdictional and created no new causes of action.59 Justice Souter, 
however, pointed out that the drafters of the ATS understood that federal 
common law would provide a cause of action for the three violations of 
international law thought to carry personal liability at the time: offenses 
against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy.60 Since then, 
a significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making 
common law came in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, in which the 
Supreme Court denied the existence of any federal “general” common 
law.61 New causes of action under federal common law could be 
recognized for violations of norms of international law but only those 
which had the same definite content and acceptance among civilized 
nations as did the three historical paradigms at the time ATS was 
enacted. Therefore, it is the jurisdictional grant under the ATS that 
enables the federal courts to develop federal common law to recognize an 
                                                                                                                             
54. Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 972–74 (9th Cir. 2002). 
55. Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708, 708 (9th Cir. 2005). The effect of vacating the 
decision is that it has no precedential effect and may not be cited by the Ninth Circuit.  
56. Claims have been made that a corporate actor has directly violated such a norm. 
For example, in one case, it was alleged that a corporation directly violated the norm 
prohibiting forced labor which derived from the prohibition on the slave trade. Flomo v. 
Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011). 
57. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
58. Id. at 697. 
59. Id. at 713. 
60. Id. at 724–25. 
61. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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action for damages for violations of those norms of customary 
international law that have these characteristics.62 
Justice Souter insisted that the federal courts should recognize 
private claims under federal common law only for violations of those 
international law norms which had the same definite content and 
acceptance among civilized nations as did the three historical paradigms 
at the time the ATS was enacted.63 The determination of whether a norm 
was sufficiently definite to support a cause of action “should (and, indeed, 
inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical 
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal 
courts.”64 A related consideration was whether international law extends 
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator 
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.65 Other factors that might limit the availability of relief in the 
federal courts for violations of customary international law could include 
a requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, as well as a 
policy of case-specific deference to the political branches.66 Justice Souter 
then concluded that Alvarez’s relatively brief period of detention in 
excess of positive authority did not show a violation of any international 
law norm that met this standard.  
                                                                                                                             
62. Judge Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit analyzed the nature of the ATS cause of 
action as follows:  
Thus, it is by now widely recognized that the norms [Sosa] recognizes as actionable 
under the ATS begin as part of international law—which, without more, would not 
be considered federal law for Article III purposes—but they become federal common 
law once recognized to have the particular characteristics required to be 
enforceable under the ATS. 
 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 752 (9th Cir. 2011). 
63. Justice Souter referred with approval to language in previous ATS decisions. See 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“For the purposes of civil liability, 
the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humanis 
generis, an enemy of all mankind.”); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[ATS was limited to] a handful of heinous actions—each of which 
violates definable and universal and obligatory norms.”); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a norm is “specific, universal and obligatory”). 
64. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004). 
65. Id. at 732 n.20. 
66. Id. at 732–33 n.21. One case suggests there is a strong argument that “federal 
courts should give serious weight to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch’s view of the case’s impact on 
foreign policy.” In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733). However, despite the formal statements of interest by 
the South African government and the Executive Branch of the United States expressing 
support for dismissal, Judge Schiendlin declined to dismiss on grounds of comity and 
political question. Id. at 296. 
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Justice Breyer concurred with Justice Souter, but pointed out that 
substantive uniformity on a norm of international law would not 
automatically lead to universal jurisdiction.67 The eighteenth century 
consensus on piracy, for instance, was not only that it was wrong but also 
that any nation could prosecute any pirate. Today, international law 
sometimes reflects procedural agreement on universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute a subset of universally-condemned behaviors—such as torture, 
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. This procedural 
consensus showed that universal jurisdiction was consistent with notions 
of comity. Criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplated a significant 
degree of civil tort recovery as well.68 
The call for judicial restraint in Sosa as to the recognition of new 
causes of action based on violations of customary international law might 
have indicated that such norms were limited to those for which universal 
criminal jurisdiction exist, as Justice Breyer indicated.69 However, there 
has been no limitation of ATS claims to those jus cogens norms of 
customary international law, which impose universal criminal 
jurisdiction on non-state actors. The federal courts have recognized 
causes of action in suits brought under the ATS in respect of a range of 
norms of customary international law under which criminal liability 
could not be incurred by a non-state actor, such as those prohibiting 
torture, extrajudicial killing, apartheid, cruel and inhuman treatment,70 
and non-consensual medical experimentation.71 Section 1983 and “state 
action” have continued to be used to link a non-state actor defendant to 
the violation of such a norm.  
 
International Criminal Law and Civil Liability Under  
Customary International Law 
 
Customary international law can only have a horizontal effect on 
non-state actors by reference to norms that directly regulate the conduct 
of such parties. These norms derive from international criminal law, 
which consists of the three international crimes for which individuals can 
be prosecuted before an international tribunal: war crimes, genocide, 
                                                                                                                             
67. Id. at 761–62 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
68. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, disagreed with the majority on the basis 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie left the federal courts with no discretion to create 
federal common law. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 741–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment). 
69. Id. at 748. 
70. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 302–03. 
71. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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crimes against humanity, and the wider set of international crimes for 
which there is universal jurisdiction entitling any state to prosecute an 
offender. This brings in the initial three prohibitions against piracy; 
violations of safe conducts; and offenses against ambassadors, which 
were in force in 1789 when the ATS was enacted; along with the later 
prohibitions against slave trading (now extended to forced labor). With 
regards to state actors, there is also the prohibition against torture.  
Although a wider range of norms of customary international law have 
been invoked in ATS suits through use of the “color of law” jurisprudence 
under section 1983, this is a purely American phenomenon and has no 
justification in customary international law. The point was made in 
Bowoto v. Chevron, where Judge Illston noted that the Supreme Court in 
Sosa had clearly stated that the scope of liability had to be decided by 
international law.72 Further, there was no international law authority to 
support the view that a defendant acting under “color of law” could be 
found liable for the violation of a norm of international law.73 
Accordingly, we must look to international criminal law to find norms 
which directly affect non-state actors. Those norms can then form the 
basis of civil liability, through the incorporation of customary 
international law into the domestic order of the state in which suit is to 
be brought.  
The ATS jurisprudence on civil liability of non-state actors by 
reference to international criminal law shows the basis of a universal 
civil liability of private parties in respect of a limited number of jus 
cogens violations of customary international law. Most of the allegations 
in ATS suits against non-state actors have been in respect of aiding and 
abetting international crimes, rather than in respect of primary liability 
for the crime.74 In addressing such claims, the federal courts have looked 
at the following principal sources:75 decisions of the Nuremburg and 
                                                                                                                             
72. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C. 99-02506, 2006 WL 2455752, at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 22, 2006). 
73. Id. at *5–*8. 
74. Such claims have been unsuccessfully made in several other contexts. See, e.g., 
Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying claim based on forced 
labor); Adhikari v. Daoud, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (denying claim based 
on forced labor); Roe I. v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1024 (S.D. Ind. 2007) 
(denying claim based on forced labor); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 
588 (E.D. Va. 2009) (denying claim based on war crimes); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 
F.3d 1252, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (denying claim based on war crimes); Abagninin v. 
AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying claim based on 
crimes against humanity). 
75. In Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., the Ninth Circuit split, with the majority looking to 
international criminal law and Judge Reinhardt looking to federal tort law on aiding and 
abetting. 395 F.3d 932, 949–950 (9th Cir. 2002). The decision was vacated following an en 
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Tokyo tribunals, decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the provisions of the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (the “Rome Statute”).76 Six problematic 
areas have emerged with regards to the content of international criminal 
law on aiding and abetting. 
 
(1) Aiding and Abetting: What Are the Norms of Customary 
International Law? 
 
In Unocal, the majority linked aiding and abetting liability under 
customary international law with those norms for which a non-state actor 
could incur criminal liability under international law.77 Thus, non-state 
actors cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting torture, as a primary 
offense, unless the torture arose in the course of forced labor, a norm for 
which a non-state actor could incur primary criminal liability.78 Judge 
Illston in Bowoto initially adopted this view, when she held that the 
international law norms invoked by the plaintiff (the prohibition of 
torture, and of extrajudicial killing) placed no direct liability on a private 
party.79 Thus, it would be inappropriate to allow liability to be imposed 
on a private party for aiding and abetting a breach of such a norm.80 
However, in 2007, she reversed this finding, accepting that it had been 
based on the faulty premise that if a party could not be liable as a 
principal, it could not be liable as an aider and abetter.81 Consequently, 
civil liability for aiding and abetting could arise under the ATS in respect 
of any norm of customary international law that was sufficiently 
established under the criteria set out by the Supreme Court in Sosa. For 
example, in 2009, in In re South African Apartheid Litigation, Judge 
Schiendlin held that companies that had aided and abetted apartheid 
could be liable under the ATS for violating the laws of nations.82 
However, apartheid can only be committed by a state, and therefore no 
                                                                                                                             
banc rehearing and the case subsequently settled before it was reheard. Id. Since then, 
most circuits have applied international criminal law to aiding and abetting claims. 
76. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90.  
77. See generally Doe I. v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
78. See id. at 934. 
79. Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455752, at *5–*8. 
80. Id.  
81. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No C-99-02506, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59374 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 13, 2007). 
82. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 269–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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individual could be held criminally liable for it before any international 
criminal tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court. 
 
(2) What is the Mens Rea for Aiding and Abetting Under International 
Criminal Law?  
 
The federal courts have adopted the definition of the actus reus for 
aiding and abetting under international criminal law as set out by the 
ICTY Tribunal in Prosecutor v. Furundzija as “practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime.”83 However, opinion is divided as to what is 
required by way of mens rea. Is it knowing assistance or purposive 
assistance? Most of the Nuremberg decisions and those of the ICTY and 
ICTR would point to knowing assistance. However, the Rome Statute of 
1998 establishing the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) would appear 
in article 25 to point towards purposive assistance. Subsection 3 provides 
that a person “shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime” if that person “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its 
attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission.”84 In 2009, the Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of 
                                                                                                                             
83. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, ¶ ¶ 195–225, 236–40 
(Int’l Trib. for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Dec. 10, 1998) 
(reviewing case law). The Rome Statute of 1998 does not define the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting. Id.; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 
2007) aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008): 
With respect to the actus reus component of the aiding and abetting liability, the 
international legislation is less helpful in identifying a specific standard. However, 
in the course of its analysis of customary international law, the ICTY concluded 
that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires 
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of the crime.”  
 
Id. 
84. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. However, article 30(1) of the Rome Statute goes on to state:  
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge. Paragraph two then provides 
that a person has intent where: ‘(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to 
engage in the conduct; [and] (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to 
cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events’ (emphasis added). 
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Sudan v. Talisman Energy adopted purposive assistance as the 
international law test for the mental element necessary to impose 
liability on a party as an aider and abetter.85 
The position of other circuits on this question is mixed. In Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, the Ninth Circuit was prepared to assume that the mens rea for 
aiding and abetting under international criminal law was purposive 
assistance, without deciding the issue.86 In contrast, in Doe v. Exxon, the 
majority of the Court of Appeals for the District Columbia held that 
customary international law on aiding and abetting was to be found in 
the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR, and that, in any event, the Rome 
Statute contemplated the mens rea requirement based on knowledge 
rather than intention.87 The position in international criminal tribunals 
is equally mixed with two decisions in 2013 going different ways. In 
Prosecutor v. Perišić,88 the ICTY held that it had to be established that 
the defendant’s assistance was “specifically directed” to aiding the 
commission of the offense, whereas in Prosecutor v. Taylor,89 the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber held that the mens rea of aiding 
and abetting was knowledge. 
 
(3) Must the Plaintiff Exhaust Domestic Remedies? 
 
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit 
considered Justice Souter’s suggestion in Sosa that ATS suits might be 
                                                                                                                             
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 30(1), July 17, 1998, 2187  
U.N.T.S. 90. 
85. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, 259–60 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
86. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765–66 (9th Cir. 2011). 
87. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Judge Rogers pointed 
to article 25(3)(d), which provides liability for an individual who “contributes to the 
commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose” where such contribution is “intentional” and either “made with the aim of 
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group” or “made in the knowledge 
of the intention of the group to commit the crime” and to article 30, which provides that “a 
person has intent where . . . [i]n relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” Id. Judge 
Rogers also highlighted a case applying a “knowledge” standard under article 25(3)(a) to 
international law violations by a co-perpetrator: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
ICC/01/04–01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Int’l Crim. 
Court Jan. 29, 2007). Id. at 37. 
88. Prosecutor v. Perišić, IT-04-81-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 
28, 2013). 
89. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-A (10766-11114) (Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Sept. 26, 2013). 
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subject to a requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies.90 The suit 
involved claims by inhabitants of Bougainville who had suffered during 
the civil war and the resulting blockade of the island by Papua New 
Guinea, prompted by protests against Rio Tinto’s operation of its giant 
Panguna mine.91 The claim was brought against Rio Tinto, and the 
allegation was that it had been complicit in various violations of 
customary international law by the Papua New Guinea Defensive Force. 
It was alleged that a senior executive in the company urged a blockade of 
the island with the words: “[s]tarve the bastards out, some more, and 
they [will] come round.”92 Rio Tinto attempted to get the case thrown out, 
arguing forum non conveniens, comity, political question, act of state, 
inapplicability of international law to corporations, and failure to exhaust 
domestic remedies.93  
The Ninth Circuit remanded the action for the limited purpose of 
ascertaining whether, as an initial, prudential matter, exhaustion of 
domestic remedies should be required. Judge McKeown concluded that 
“in ATS cases where the United States ‘nexus’ is weak, courts should 
carefully consider the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
particularly—but not exclusively—with respect to claims that do not 
involve matters of ‘universal concern.’”94 When the case was remitted to 
the district court, Judge Morrow found that the question of exhaustion 
did not need to be considered with regards to claims involving matters of 
universal concern, such as the claims for crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and racial discrimination.95 However, the traditional two-step 
exhaustion analysis96 would be applied to the other ATS claims for 
violation of the rights to health, life, and security of the person; cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment; international environmental 
violations; and a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations. The 
plaintiffs decided to abandon these claims.97 
 
                                                                                                                             
90. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2008). 
91. Id. at 825–26.  
92. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
93. Sarei, 550 F.3d at 842. 
94. Id. at 831. 
95. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1020 (C.D. Cal 2009). 
96. Id. at 1011 n.9. The analysis requires determining whether local remedies exist as 
the first step and then, as a second step, determining whether they are ineffective, 
unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or otherwise futile to pursue. 
97. Judge Morrow’s decisions with regards to the claims for crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and racial discrimination were upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 770 (9th Cir. 2011). The Seventh Circuit declined to apply an 
exhaustion analysis in a separate case. See Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013, 1024–1025 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
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(4) Can Corporations Incur Liability under Customary International 
Law?  
 
Until 2010, it had been assumed that corporations, as well as natural 
persons, could incur liability under the ATS.98 This would change when 
the question was raised by the Second Circuit sua sponte in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum.99 In 2010, the majority held that there was no 
jurisdiction under the ATS to hear a claim against a corporation for an 
alleged violation of a norm of customary international law.100 The ATS 
tort jurisdiction extended to those individuals who had committed 
international crimes, and it therefore followed that it could not extend to 
corporations, although individual perpetrators in a corporation could still 
incur liability.101 International law, and not domestic law, determined the 
reach of the ATS, in regards to what norm was broken and who were the 
persons liable for breach of that norm.102 Footnote twenty of Justice 
Souter’s opinion in Sosa also mandated that the courts use international 
law to determine the subjects of international law.103 
As corporations have never been the subject of international criminal 
liability, it follows that they cannot incur civil liability under customary 
international law. Judge Cabranes reviewed the development of 
international law from the Nuremberg trials onwards.104 Nuremberg 
made explicit the proposition that individuals could incur liability for 
committing international crimes, but this principle was expressly 
confined to natural persons.105 The tribunals had no jurisdiction to 
impose criminal liability on the organization itself.106 Although the 
tribunals had the authority to declare an organization to be criminal, this 
was to facilitate the imposition of criminal liability on the individual 
members of the organization. All subsequent international criminal 
                                                                                                                             
98. In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., Judge Schwarz had 
held that corporations could incur liability under the ATS. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 318–19 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). This finding was reiterated by Judge Cote in a later case of the same name, 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). The only judicial support for the view that there is no basis for imposing liability on 
corporations under customary international law was to be found in the dissent of Judge 
Korman of the Second Circuit in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 
292–93 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
99. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
100. Id. at 145–47. 
101. Id. 
102.  Id. at 148–49. 
103.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–33 n.20 (2004). 
104.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118–21, 132–37. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
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tribunals from the ICTY and ICTR to the ICC107 had possessed 
jurisdiction over natural persons, but not over legal persons.108 In 
contrast, Judge Leval, in his dissent, looked to customary international 
law to determine the norms imposing liability, including those relating to 
aiding and abetting, and then to domestic law to supply the remedy for 
breach.109 The second stage determined who could be liable: because 
corporations were subject to civil liability under U.S. domestic law, they 
could also be liable under the ATS.110 
A circuit split has also opened up, with three circuits subsequently 
holding that claims against corporations for violations of the law of 
nations can be made under the ATS. First, in the Seventh Circuit case, 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber, Judge Posner held that the factual 
premise underlying the majority’s decision in Kiobel was incorrect and 
that, at Nuremberg, two measures had specifically provided sanctions 
against organizations.111 Second, the Ninth Circuit, in Sarei v Rio Tinto, 
held that neither the language nor the legislative history of the ATS 
suggested that corporate liability was excluded and that only liability of 
natural persons was intended.112 Judge Schroeder stated that footnote 
twenty of Sosa:  
expressly frames the relevant international-law inquiry to be the scope of liability 
of private actors for a violation of the ‘given norm,’ i.e. an international-law inquiry 
specific to each cause of action asserted . . . . The proper inquiry, therefore, should 
                                                                                                                             
107.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), July 17, 1998,  
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to 
this [s]tatute.”). 
108.  Unlike the Nuremberg tribunals, these subsequent tribunals had not been 
given jurisdiction to declare organizations to be criminal. 
109.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145–47 (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment of the 
court dismissing the complaint and filing a separate opinion). In April 2014 in In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation, No. 02MDL 1499 (SAS), 2014 WL 1569423, *13–*14 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 17, 2014), Judge Schiendlin concluded that the Supreme Court in Kiobel had implicitly 
accepted that corporations could incur liability under the ATS. 
110.  Id. at 173–76. 
111.  Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015–17 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing “Control Council Law No. 2, ‘Providing for the Termination and Liquidation of 
the Nazi Organizations,’” and “Control Council Law No. 9, ‘Providing for the Seizure of 
Property Owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof,’” under which the seizure 
of all I.G. Farben’s assets was ordered with a direction that some of them be made 
“available for reparations”) Id. at 1017 (citations omitted). 
112.  Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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consider separately each violation of international law alleged and which actors 
may violate it.113 
With regards to genocide, the ICJ’s decision in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina114 made it explicitly clear that a state may be responsible for 
genocide committed by groups or persons whose actions are attributable 
to the state. “This clarity about collective responsibility implies that 
organizational actors such as corporations or paramilitary groups may 
commit genocide. Given the universal nature of the prohibition, if an 
actor is capable of committing genocide, that actor can necessarily be 
held liable for violating the jus cogens prohibition on genocide.”115 A 
similar conclusion was reached regarding war crimes. The text of 
Common Article III of the Fourth Geneva Convention binds “each [p]arty 
to the conflict[;]” because parties to a non-international conflict must, by 
definition, include at least one non-state actor, entity, or group, the 
provision could not reasonably be interpreted to be limited to states.116 
Third, the District Court for the District of Columbia, in Doe I. v. Exxon 
Mobil, held that the norms of conduct in an ATS suit were derived from 
customary international law—including those relating to aiding and 
abetting, but not the “technical accoutrements” to the ATS cause of 
action, such as corporate liability and agency law, which were to be 
determined under federal common law.117 
                                                                                                                             
113.  Id. at 748. 
114.  Int’l Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: 
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 2007 INT’L CT. JUST. REP. 43, 114, ¶ 167. 
115.  Sarei, 671 F.3d. at 759–60. 
116.  Id. at 786. 
117.  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The district court 
explained: 
Our analysis begins by recognizing that corporate liability differs fundamentally 
from the conduct-governing norms at issue in Sosa, and consequently customary 
international law does not provide the rule of decision. Then we establish that 
corporate liability is consistent with the purpose of the ATS, with the 
understanding of agency law in 1789 and the present, and with sources of 
international law. Our conclusion differs from that of the Second Circuit in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., . . . because its analysis conflates the norms of 
conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules for any remedy to be found in federal 
common law at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets the 
import of footnote 20 in Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in examining the sources 
of customary international law. 
 
 Id. (citation omitted). 
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The issue was due to be resolved by the Supreme Court, who, in 2011, 
granted a writ of certiorari in Kiobel to determine the issue of “whether 
corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of 
nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide [or] may 
instead be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant 
under the ATS for such egregious violations.”118 However, after oral 
argument in February 2012, the Supreme Court directed the parties to 
file supplemental briefs addressing an additional question: “[w]hether 
and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a 
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”119 The Supreme 
Court heard oral argument on this issue in October 2012 and on April 17, 
2013, and unanimously upheld the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the 
complaint.120 Its judgment was based entirely on its answer to the second 
question. Accordingly, the first issue remains unresolved and is likely to 
remain so given that the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision on the 
extraterritorial reach of the ATS is likely to call a halt on future ATS 
suits.121 
 
(5) What Happens When International Law Runs Out?  
 
Many of these ATS cases are brought against parent corporations 
whose subsidiaries are alleged to have aided and abetted state violations 
of jus cogens norms. But what law do we use to determine the 
responsibility of a parent corporation for the defaults of its subsidiary? 
There is, not surprisingly, few guidance in international criminal law on 
this point, as corporations have never been the subjects of international 
criminal law—a point fastened on by the Second Circuit in dismissing the 
ATS claim in Kiobel for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In 2009, in In 
re South African Apartheid Litigation, Judge Schiendlin held that 
although the ATS requires the application of customary international law 
whenever possible, it is necessary to rely on federal common law in 
                                                                                                                             
118.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). In 2012, the 
Supreme Court held that claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 could only 
be advanced against natural persons. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707–
80 (2012). 
119.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012). 
120.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660–62 (2013). 
121.  In April 2014 in In re South African Apartheid Litigation, No. 02MDL 1499 
(SAS), 2014 WL 1569423, at *13–*14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2014), Judge Schiendlin held that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel implicitly accepted that corporations could be liable 
under the ATS, contrary to the Second Circuit’s majority decision in 2010. 
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limited instances in order to fill gaps.122 Vicarious liability was clearly 
established under customary international law, obviating any concerns 
regarding universality. Command responsibility, the military analogue to 
holding a principal liable for the acts of an agent, was firmly established 
by the Nuremberg Tribunals.123 However, as the international law of 
agency had not developed precise standards in the civil context,124 federal 
common law principles concerning agency should be applied.125 
 
(6) Extraterritoriality and Customary International Law 
 
All ATS claims will have a foreign element: the plaintiff must be an 
alien. However, many ATS claims involve allegations of violations of 
international law occurring outside the United States. Where the 
defendant is also an alien, the result is that the claims are heard in U.S. 
federal courts, although they have no connection with the United States 
at all. These are so-called “foreign-cubed”126 suits which involve claims by 
a foreign plaintiff against a foreign defendant in respect to events that 
took place in a foreign jurisdiction. In Kiobel, the governments of the 
United Kingdom127 and the Netherlands128 submitted amicus briefs to the 
Supreme Court arguing that international law does not permit a state to 
                                                                                                                             
122.  In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 271 (2009).  
123.  Steve Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 504–06 (2001). Professor Ratner has argued that 
command responsibility provides a plausible way of developing customary international law 
on this issue. Id. 
124.  In contrast, in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. 
Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), Judge Cote, applying the conflicts of law rules of New York, 
held that this issue was to be determined under the law of the place of incorporation of the 
company whose veil is to be pierced. Id. at 682–83. The allegation that the subsidiaries had 
acted as agents of the parent would be determined either under the law of Sudan as the lex 
loci delicti and domicile of most plaintiffs, or of the law of Canada, as the domicile of 
Talisman, with a presumption in favor of the former. Id. at 687–88. 
125.  In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 271. In Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 191–96 (2d Cir. 2010), Judge Leval dissented on the 
corporate liability point but agreed that the claim should be dismissed. One of his reasons 
was on the facts alleged: the plaintiffs had failed to plead a basis for a claim of agency or 
alter ego liability so as to make the parent corporation liable for the defaults of its 
subsidiary. Id. at 191–94. 
126.  According to the Second Circuit in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 
547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008), the phrase was coined in 2004. 
127.  Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2012) (No. 10-1491). 
128.  Brief of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel v 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2012) (No. 10-1491). 
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entertain civil claims involving foreign parties with respect to conduct 
that took place entirely in the jurisdiction of another state.129 However, in 
the U.K., it is quite possible for jurisdiction to be established in a 
“foreign-cubed” case through service of proceedings, although the 
proceedings are liable to be stayed based on forum non conveniens.130 
This will not always be the case, for a stay will be denied where the 
claimant can establish that there would be substantial injustice in being 
required to proceed in the alternative forum.131 Furthermore, although 
there are rules of international law regarding the permissible criminal 
jurisdiction of states, it is not clearly established that there are similar 
rules relating to civil jurisdiction.132 
 
Kiobel and Beyond? 
 
In 2011, two critical developments occurred that were to determine 
the future scope of the ATS. First, the Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari in Kiobel to determine the issue of “whether corporations are 
immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations such as 
torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide [or] may instead be sued in 
the same manner as any other private party defendant under the ATS for 
such egregious violations.”133 Secondly, the Supreme Court, in Morrison 
                                                                                                                             
129.  In the end, Kiobel was not decided on the basis of any rule of international law: 
either in regard to the civil liability of corporations for violations of customary international 
law, or in regard to a rule precluding a state from asserting jurisdiction over “foreign-cubed” 
civil claims that have no connection with that state. Rather, the Supreme Court decided the 
case based on the application of a U.S. canon of statutory interpretation, which restricted 
the causes of action that could arise in the federal courts under the grant of jurisdiction in 
the ATS. 
130.  ATS suits may also be dismissed on this basis, as well as on other grounds of 
abstention, such as comity, act of state, and political question. However, over the last ten 
years, it has been rare for the federal courts to dismiss ATS suits on such grounds.  
131.  An example is provided by The Vishva Ajay, [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 558 (Q.B.) 
which involved a collision in an Indian port and a claim made against the Indian owners of 
the colliding vessel. Service had been effected by the arrest of a sister-ship and the English 
proceedings. Although India was the appropriate forum, the court refused to stay the 
English proceedings following evidence that a trial in India would be delayed for many 
years, making the testimony of witnesses involved less reliable. A similar analysis is 
applied when a court decides whether to give permission to serve proceedings out of the 
jurisdiction. Cherney v. Deripaska, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 849, [2010] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 456 is 
an instance of a “foreign-cubed” case in which permission was given because substantial 
injustice would occur were the case to proceed in the natural forum, Russia. 
132.  See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 652 (6th ed. 2008) (noting that the 
rarity of diplomatic protests has led some writers to conclude that customary international 
law does not prescribe any particular regulations to restrict courts’ jurisdiction in civil 
matters). 
133.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661–62 (2012). 
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v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., reconfirmed a canon of construction 
whereby U.S. statutes are presumed not to have extraterritorial effect.134 
For more than forty years, the United States courts had applied the 
antifraud provisions of federal securities law to actors and transactions 
operating outside the United States. The Supreme Court held that 
although this may be permitted under international law, it was necessary 
for Congress to give a clear indication that it wanted United States law to 
apply to securities transactions in foreign markets.135 On April 17, 2013, 
these two developments were to come together in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kiobel.136 
The initial issue referred to the Supreme Court in Kiobel was that of 
corporate liability under the ATS. However, after oral argument in 
February 2012, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing an additional question: “[w]hether and 
under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of 
a sovereign other than the United States.” The Supreme Court heard oral 
argument on this issue in October 2012 and on April 17, 2013, and 
unanimously upheld the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the complaint.137 
Its judgment was based entirely on its answer to the second question. 
The decision is likely to stop the elucidation of civil liability of non-state 
actors under customary international law through ATS suits in the U.S. 
federal courts. 
The majority opinion was based on the application of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application, which had recently been reaffirmed 
in Morrison, and which was typically applied to discern whether an Act of 
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that in Morrison, the Supreme Court had noted that the 
question of extraterritorial application was a “merits question,” not a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, whereas the ATS, on the other 
hand, was “strictly jurisdictional.”138 However, he then went on to say: 
“But we think the principles underlying the canon of interpretation 
                                                                                                                             
134.  Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–57 (2010). 
135.  Id. at 253–54. 
136.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel, the Ninth Circuit, in Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 736 (9th Cir. 2011), had held that the ATS was not 
constrained by this presumption. 
137.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice Kennedy filed a 
concurring opinion. Id. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas 
joined. Id. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Id. at 1670. 
138.  Id. at 1664 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)). 
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similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be 
brought under the ATS.”139 To rebut the presumption, the ATS would 
need to evince a “clear indication of extraterritoriality[,]”140 which it did 
not. Even where the claims did touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they had to do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.141 Mere corporate 
presence would not suffice. On the facts, all the relevant conduct took 
place outside the United States (in Nigeria), and the Second Circuit’s 
dismissal was affirmed.  
Justice Kennedy concurred, but noted that it was proper for the 
Court 
to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and 
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute . . . . Other cases may arise with 
allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting 
persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA142 nor by the reasoning and 
holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation 
of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some 
further elaboration and explanation.”143 
Justice Alito, in his concurrence with which Justice Thomas agreed, 
stated: “As a result, a putative ATS cause of action will fall within the 
scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore 
be barred—unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an 
international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness 
and acceptance among civilized nations.”144 This is the most stringent 
approach to the presumption against extraterritorial application, and 
would mean that there would be no cause of action under the ATS in 
cases like Filartiga, where the violation of the international law norm 
prohibiting torture took place in Peru. It would also deny an action 
against pirates where the violation of the international law norm took 
place on the High Seas.  
Justice Breyer agreed with the result but did not invoke the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. He concluded that there would 
be jurisdiction under the ATS where: the alleged tort occurs on American 
soil, and the defendant is an American national; or the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                             
139.  Id. at 1664. 
140.  Id. at 1665 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264 
(2010)). 
141.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264–73. 
142.  Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1991).  
143.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
144.  Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
national interest, including a distinct interest in preventing the United 
States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal 
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.145 The second 
element would cover cases such as Filartiga and In re Estate of Marcos, 
Human Rights Litigation.146 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel has sounded the death knell 
for “foreign-cubed” suits—a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant in 
respect of actions that took place outside the U.S.—proceeding in the 
federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute.147 What is less clear is 
whether the decision will close off “foreign-squared” suits under the ATS. 
These involve an alien plaintiff suing a U.S. defendant in respect of a 
violation of international law that took place in a foreign jurisdiction, as 
was the case in Unocal.148 There would be scope for such suits under 
Justice Breyer’s analysis in Kiobel,149 in cases where there was a distinct 
national interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe 
haven for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind. In contrast, 
Justice Alito’s statement that a putative ATS action would be barred 
“unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law 
norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance 
among civilized nations” would rule out any such suits proceeding under 
the ATS. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, with its reference to the need 
                                                                                                                             
145.  Id. at 1674. In doing so, Justice Breyer referred to the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law §§ 402–04 (1986). Id. at 1671. The latter is particularly significant in 
that it explains that a “state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain 
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, 
slave trade,” and analogous behavior. Id. at 1673. 
146.  In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994). 
147.  A further development which will limit the scope of extraterritorial litigation in 
the federal courts, and not just under the ATS, is the tightening of the rules regarding 
personal jurisdiction following the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). Following this decision, it is doubtful that 
Shell would have been subject to general jurisdiction by reason of its “Investor Relations 
Office” in New York, as was held in an earlier companion case, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). On April 22, 2013, just five days after its 
judgment in Kiobel, the Supreme Court in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman granted the 
defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari to determine “whether it violates due process for 
a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on 
the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant 
in the forum State.” 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013). The Supreme Court subsequently gave a 
negative answer to this question and held that there would only be general personal 
jurisdiction where the defendant corporation is essentially regarded as “at home” in the 
forum state. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
148.  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (2002). 
149.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671. 
  
 
 
 
 
2015] HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 115 
 
 
for the claims to “touch and concern” the territory of the United States 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application, leaves this question open.  
Decisions in the wake of Kiobel show that claims may be brought 
under the ATS where the violation of the law of nations takes place on 
U.S. territory, or on U.S. territory abroad, such as an embassy. It will 
not, however, apply where a U.S. defendant is sued in relation to a 
violation of the law of nations that takes place outside the U.S. In 
analyzing the effect of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application and Chief Justice Roberts’s “touch and concern” wording, 
there has been a divergence of views. In the first two cases, the question 
of whether the presumption is rebutted is purely a question of analysis of 
the statute itself. The presumption is not rebutted within the ATS, which 
does not show a clear indication of extraterritoriality, and there is no 
room for any judicial discretion. In the latter two cases, there appears to 
be room for judicial discretion with regards to jurisdiction under the ATS 
for claims involving conduct outside the U.S. where the claims “touch and 
concern” the territory of the U.S. with sufficient force. 
In Balintulo v. Daimler AG,150 the latest chapter in the South African 
apartheid litigation, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that whether the relevant conduct occurred abroad is simply one prong of 
a multi-factor test, and the ATS still reaches extraterritorial conduct 
when the defendant is an American national. The Supreme Court in 
Kiobel had expressly held that claims under the ATS could be brought 
only for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of 
the United States. In this case, all the human rights violations took place 
in South Africa. The ATS did not permit claims based on illegal conduct 
that occurred entirely in the territory of another sovereign, and there was 
no room for judicial discretion.151 In contrast, in Mwani v. bin Laden,152 
Judge Facciola invoked the “touch and concern” language of Morrison to 
hold that the presumption against extraterritoriality had been displaced 
in a claim under the ATS arising out of the bombing of the U.S. Embassy 
in Nairobi by Al Qaida in 1998. “Surely, if any circumstances were to fit 
the court’s framework of ‘touching and concerning the United States with 
                                                                                                                             
150.  Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189–91 (2d Cir. 2013). 
151.  Id. at 191–92. The complaint alleged that the U.S. defendant parent 
corporations were vicariously liable for aiding and abetting of violations of the laws of 
nations committed within South Africa by their South African subsidiaries. However, none 
of those acts took place within the U.S. and therefore the U.S. parent corporations could not 
be vicariously liable for that conduct under the ATS. Claims of derivative liability depended 
on the viability of the underlying claim. 
152.  Mwani v. bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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sufficient force,’ it would be a terrorist attack that 1) was plotted in part 
within the United States[;] and 2) was directed at a United States 
Embassy and its employees.”153 An ATS suit has also survived a post-
Kiobel challenge to jurisdiction in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively.154 
The case involved a claim against a U.S. citizen residing in 
Massachusetts for allegedly aiding and abetting a claim for persecution 
amounting to a crime against humanity, based on a systematic and 
widespread campaign of persecution against lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and intersex (“LGBTI”) people in Uganda.155 Judge Ponsor 
held that there was jurisdiction to hear the claim under the ATS. 
Although the impact of the defendant’s conduct was felt in Uganda, his 
actions in planning and managing a campaign of repression in the 
Uganda had taken place in the U.S. and were “analogous to a terrorist 
designing and manufacturing a bomb in this country, which he then 
mails to Uganda with the intent that it explode there.” 156 
Recently, in Al-Shimari v. CACI International, Incorporated, the 
Fourth Circuit held that there was subject matter jurisdiction in a claim 
against a U.S. defendant corporation arising out of alleged torture and 
war crimes arising at Abu Ghraib.157 Judge Barbara Keenan found that 
the case differed from Kiobel and Balintulo, stating: 
                                                                                                                             
153.  Id. at 5. However, because this was likely to be the first opinion given after 
Kiobel, Judge Facciola immediately certified this issue for appeal to the court of appeals 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. 
154.  Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315–17 (D. Mass. 
2013). 
155.  Id. at 309. Although there was a circuit split as to the mens rea element for 
aiding and abetting under international law, the court did not need to resolve the issue, as 
the plaintiffs had pleaded that they had given purposive assistance to the Ugandan 
authorities. Id. at 318.  
156.  Id. at 328. The amended complaint alleged that after the defendant travelled to 
Uganda in 2002, he continued to assist, manage, and advise associates in Uganda on 
methods to deprive the Ugandan LGBTI community of its basic rights. Id. at 323. His 
Ugandan co-conspirators contacted him in the United States in 2009 to craft tactics to 
counter the Ugandan High Court ruling confirming that LGBTI persons enjoyed basic 
protections of the law. Id. After going to Uganda in 2009, he continued to communicate from 
the United States through Martin Ssempa to members of the Ugandan Parliament about 
the legislation proposing the death penalty for homosexuality; from his home in the United 
States, he reviewed a draft of the legislation and provided advice on its content. Id.  
157.  Al-Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014) (reversing the 
previous decision of Judge Lee in Al-Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F.Supp.2d 857 (E.D. 
Va. 2013)). As had been the case in Balintulo, Judge Lee had held that the presumption 
against extraterritorial application is only rebuttable by legislative act and not by judicial 
decision. Id. at 866. 
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In the present case, however, the issue is not as easily resolved. The 
plaintiffs’ claims reflect extensive “relevant conduct” in United States 
territory, in contrast to the “mere presence” of foreign corporations that 
was deemed insufficient in Kiobel. When a claim’s substantial ties to 
United States territory include the performance of a contract executed by 
a United States corporation with the United States government, a more 
nuanced analysis is required to determine whether the presumption has 
been displaced. In such cases, it is not sufficient merely to say that 
because the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch 
and concern United States territory. 
Here, the plaintiffs’ claims allege acts of torture committed by United 
States citizens who were employed by an American corporation, CACI, 
which has corporate headquarters located in Fairfax County, Virginia. 
The alleged torture occurred at a military facility operated by United 
States government personnel. 
In addition, the employees who allegedly participated in the acts of 
torture were hired by CACI in the United States to fulfill the terms of a 
contract that CACI executed with the United States Department of the 
Interior. The contract between CACI and the Department of the Interior 
was issued by a government office in Arizona, and CACI was authorized to 
collect payments by mailing invoices to government accounting offices in 
Colorado. Under the terms of the contract, CACI interrogators were 
required to obtain security clearances from the United States Department 
of Defense. 
Finally, the allegations are not confined to the assertion that CACI’s 
employees participated directly in acts of torture committed at the Abu 
Ghraib prison. The plaintiffs also allege that CACI’s managers located in 
the United States were aware of reports of misconduct abroad, attempted 
to ‘cover up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged’ 
it.158 
                                                                                                                             
158.  Id. at 528–29. On August 28, 2014, in In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 
No. 02 MDL 1499 (SAS), 2014 WL 4290444, *4–*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014) Judge 
Schiendlin distinguished Al-Shimari as a case involving much greater contact with the U.S. 
government, military, citizens, and territory. As with Balintulo, the instant case involved 
vicarious liability of U.S. parent corporations in respect of actions committed by their 
subsidiaries in South Africa, all of whose conduct took place abroad. 
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Kiobel has not entirely killed off future claims for violations of the 
law of nations being brought in the federal courts pursuant to the ATS, 
but it has severely curtailed them.159 The Supreme Court’s judgment 
would deny jurisdiction to almost all the cases I have mentioned in this 
paper, including Filartiga, the case that started the development of 
human rights litigation through the ATS. It is unlikely that we will see 
much more in the way of elucidation of customary international law 
through ATS suits in the federal courts. The ATS is probably the only 
way in which such claims can be brought in the federal courts. In the 
future, such claims may be brought in state courts or recast as 
conventional tort suits.160 
 
Civil Liability Under Customary International Law  
Outside the United States 
 
Outside the U.S., we can find examples in three other common law 
jurisdictions of a norm of customary international law forming the basis 
of a cause of action in a national court. First, there is the U.K. where 
there are two doctrines as to how customary international law can enter 
the domestic legal order. The first is the doctrine of incorporation, under 
which the rules of international law are incorporated into U.K. law 
automatically and considered to be part of U.K. law unless they are in 
conflict with an Act of Parliament.161 The second is the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                             
159.  One possible alternative outlet for claims based on violations of customary 
international law is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over matters 
arising under the Constitution and federal laws. In Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 
2d 117, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), it was held that U.S. citizens could sue a French bank in 
respect of the looting of their possessions in World War II, which constituted a war crime. In 
contrast, in Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 182–83 (D. Mass. 1995), it was held that 
federal law gave rise to no autonomous right to sue for breaches of customary international 
law. However, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004), Justice Souter 
observed: “Our position does not, as Justice Scalia suggests, imply that every grant of 
jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop common law (so that 
the grant of federal-question jurisdiction would be equally as good for our purposes as [28 
U.S.C.] § 1350) . . . .” Referring to Justice Souter’s observation, Judge Clifton in Serra v. 
Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010) stated that the ATS “is the only possible vehicle 
for a claim like Plaintiffs’ because no other statute recognizes a general cause of action 
under the law of nations.”  
160.  See Donald Earl Childress, III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next 
Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012). 
161.  The doctrine originates from the following statement of Lord Mansfield, C.J., in 
Triquet v. Beth, [1764] 3 Burr. 1478, [1481]: “Lord Talbot declared a clear opinion: ‘That the 
law of nations in its full extent was part of the law of England . . . . that the law of nations 
was to be collected from the practice of different nations and the authority of writers.’” Id. 
(citing Buvot v. Barbut, [1736] 3 Burr. 1481, 4 Burr. 2016). Accordingly, he argued and 
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transformation, under which the rules of international law are not to be 
considered as part of U.K. law except insofar as they have been already 
adopted and made part of our law by the decisions of the judges, or by an 
Act of Parliament, or a long-established custom.162 
In criminal proceedings, the theory of transformation has been 
applied.163 In R v. Jones (Margaret), the House of Lords held that 
international law does not create new criminal offenses and therefore the 
defendants could not advance a defense in criminal proceedings that their 
conduct had been directed at preventing an international crime, the 
crime of aggression.164 However, their Lordships stressed that they were 
making no finding with regards to the potential role of customary 
international law in civil proceedings.165 
In civil proceedings since the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, the theory of 
incorporation has been applied.166 There have since been two cases in 
which the claimants based their claims not only on conventional torts, 
but also on a violation of the international prohibition against torture, in 
an attempt to preempt the invocation of foreign sovereign immunity. The 
first was Al-Adsani v. Kuwait167 in which the court of appeal held that 
section 1 of the State Immunity Act of 1978 precluded a civil suit being 
                                                                                                                             
determined from such instances, and the authorities of Grotius, Barbeyrac, Binkershoek, 
Wiquefort, etc., there being no English writer of eminence on the subject Id. 
162  The doctrine goes back to 1876 in the judgment of Chief Justice Lord Cockburn in 
R v. Keyn, [1876] 2 Ex. D. 63, [202–03]: 
For writers on international law, however valuable their labours may be in 
elucidating and ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law. 
To be binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations who are to be 
bound by it . . . Nor, in my opinion, would the clearest proof of unanimous assent on 
the part of other nations be sufficient to authorise the tribunals of this country to 
apply, without an Act of Parliament, what would practically amount to a new law. 
In so doing, we should be unjustifiably usurping the province of the legislature. 
 
Id. 
163.  Under both doctrines, treaties only become part of English law if an enabling 
Act of Parliament has been passed. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 45 (6th ed. 2003). 
164.  R v. Jones (Margaret), [2006] UKHL 16, [2007] 1 A.C. 136. Although 
historically, the courts may have recognized breaches of international law, such as piracy, 
violations of safe conduct, and the rights of ambassadors, as creating domestic crimes, since 
R v. Knuller, [1973] A.C. 435, the courts had refused to create any new criminal offenses. 
That was entirely matter for Parliament. 
165.  See id. at ¶ 59 (Lord Hoffman), ¶ 100 (Lord Mance). 
166.  Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529. 
167.  Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 103 I.L.R. 420 (Q.B. 1995), aff’d, Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 
I.L.R. 536 (C.A. 1996). 
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brought against a foreign state for breach of this norm.168 
Notwithstanding the fact that torture is recognized as a jus cogens norm 
of customary international law and that the 1984 U.N. Convention 
Against Torture (“UNCAT”) expressly grants universal criminal 
jurisdiction against torturers. Subsequently, the decision was upheld by a 
majority decision of the European Court of Human Rights.169 The second 
case was Jones v. Saudi Arabia in which a claim for torture was made 
against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and against an individual state 
official, Colonel Aziz, and the plaintiff sought leave to serve proceedings 
out of jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia claimed sovereign immunity on behalf of 
itself and its official. The House of Lords held that UNCAT provides no 
exception to the principle of sovereign immunity in relation to civil 
proceedings.170 Although UNCAT established universal criminal 
jurisdiction in respect of torture,171 this did not translate into universal 
civil jurisdiction and accordingly, sovereign immunity could still be 
invoked with respect to civil claims against individuals who had 
committed torture.172 As to the fact that the prohibition on torture was a 
jus cogens norm, Lord Hoffmann approved the following observations: 
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national 
court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict a prohibition 
contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a 
different method of settlement. Arguably, then, there is no substantive 
content in the procedural plea of state immunity upon which a jus cogens 
mandate can bite.173 
                                                                                                                             
168.  “A [s]tate is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts General of the United 
Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this [p]art of this act.” State 
Immunity Act, 1978, § 1. 
169.  Al-Adsani v. U.K., [2002] 34 EHRR 11. 
170.  Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270, ¶¶ 29, 85 
(overruling the decision of the Court of Appeal, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1394 and [2005] Q.B. 
699, that the immunity of an official was ratione materiae only, and torture could not be 
treated as the exercise of a state function so as to attract immunity ratione materiae in 
either criminal or civil proceedings against individuals). Their Lordships’ decision on 
sovereign immunity was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) 
in Case of Jones and Others v. The United Kingdom.  
171.  Their Lordships noted that the decision in Pinochet 3 created an exception to 
sovereign immunity only in relation to criminal proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 68. 
172.  The Convention dealt with civil proceedings in article 14.1 but this only 
required a state to grant a civil remedy in respect of torture committed within its 
jurisdiction. Their Lordships noted that the decision in Pinochet 3 created an exception to 
sovereign immunity only in relation to criminal proceedings. Id. 
173.  Id. at ¶ 44. (Lord Hoffman). 
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Their Lordships, though, made no comment on whether a violation of 
the international prohibition on torture gave rise to a cause of action 
separate from that arising under domestic tort law.174 Therefore, it would 
seem that there is still some scope for making a claim on the basis of a 
breach of a violation of a norm of customary international law by a non-
state party. Although the decisions in Al-Adsani and Jones v. Saudi 
Arabia would rule out any civil claims against a state or its officials 
where the state claims immunity, the U.K. courts have yet to grapple 
with the issues of customary international law that have arisen in ATS 
cases.175 The only ATS-type case to come before the High Court to date is 
Guerrero & Others v. Monterrico Metals,176 which was pleaded as a tort 
                                                                                                                             
174.  See Francois Larocque, Recent Developments in Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation: A Postscript to Torture as Tort, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 605, 640 (2008): 
It may be that, on the basis of their inherent jurisdiction, Canadian and English 
courts are able to recognize new causes of action for torture on the theory that the 
“prohibitive rules of customary law” are incorporated into the common law. But 
looking back at the few Canadian and English transnational human rights 
proceedings on record, it is striking to note how little judicial discussion this issue 
has received. One wonders whether the Bouzari and A1-Adsani courts simply 
assumed it to be within their purview to enforce international norms through their 
civil jurisdiction. Reference to the principle of incorporation in the courts’ reasons 
for judgment supports this hypothesis, though it is impossible to draw definitive 
conclusions in the absence of explicit reasoning on this point. One possible 
explanation, of course, is that the courts did not feel compelled to say much on the 
civil actionability of the international crime of torture in light of their decisions 
that the claims were barred in any event by state immunity. 
 
175.  EU States Regulation, No. 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”) 
poses a complication with a cause of action based on the violation of such norms of 
international law. Article 4(1) provides:  
The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall 
be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in 
which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country 
or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur. 
 
A claim based on a violation of international law would raise the question of 
whether international law was incorporated into the domestic civil law of the 
country in question. If it were not, the derogation under art. 26 would probably 
apply. This provides: “The application of a provision of the law of any country 
specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum. 
 
EU States Regulation, No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007, art. 4. 
176.  Guerrero & Others v. Monterrico Metals, [2009] EWHC 2475 (Q.B.). 
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claim. However, the pleading of torture as a distinct cause of action in Al-
Adsani and Jones v. Saudi Arabia leaves open the possibility of a future 
claim being brought in the courts of the United Kingdom against a 
company based on its alleged complicity in international crimes.177 
Second, in 1995, in The Toledo, a claim was made against the Irish 
State in violation of its obligation under international law to admit 
vessels in distress to a place of refuge within its domestic waters.178 
Judge Barr held that where there is a long-standing, generally-accepted 
practice or custom in international law, then subject to established 
limitations thereon, it is part of Irish domestic law, provided that it is not 
in conflict with the constitution or an enactment of the legislature or a 
rule of the common law. On the facts, the claim was unsuccessful because 
the right of access was not absolute and was modified by countervailing 
considerations such as the risk of oil pollution or of the vessel’s sinking or 
hindering navigation should it be admitted into Irish waters.179 
Thirdly, there is Canada, where a torture claim was brought against 
Iran in 2002 in Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran180 but was dismissed 
on sovereign immunity grounds. In 2009, in Bil’in (Village Council) v. 
Green Park International Ltd.,181 a claim was brought in Canada against 
a corporation alleging complicity in war crimes in the occupied territories 
in Israel. That claim floundered on the rock of forum non conveniens.182  
 
Conclusion 
 
Early on, in the post-Filartiga renewal of the ATS, Judge Bork 
commented in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic:183 
Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to argue 
over what is or what is not an accepted violation of the law of nations. Yet 
this appears to be the clear result if we allow plaintiffs the opportunity to 
proceed under § 1350. Plaintiffs would troop to court marshalling their 
“experts” behind them. Defendants would quickly organize their own 
platoons of authorities. The typical judge or jury would be swamped in 
                                                                                                                             
177.  Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 103 I.L.R. 420 (Q.B. 1995), aff’d, Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 
I.L.R. 536 (C.A. 1996); Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270. 
178.  The Toledo, (1995) 3 I.R. 406, (1995) 2 IRLM 30. 
179.  Id. 422–27, 431–34  
180.  Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, [2002] O.J. No. 1624, aff’d, [2004] O.J. No. 
2800 Docket No. C-38295. 
181.  Bil’in (Village Council) v. Green Park Int’l Ltd., [2009] Q.C.C.S. 4151. 
182.  Id. at ¶ 335.  
183.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
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citations to various distinguished journals of international legal studies, 
but would be left with little more than a numbing sense of how varied is 
the world of public international ‘law.’ 
To some extent, this is exactly what has happened with the 
subsequent development of ATS suits. If you want to know what 
constitutes customary international law, study the ATS cases over the 
last thirty-three years. However, what this U.S. jurisprudence shows is 
that there is a limited number of norms of customary international law 
that touch and concern non-state actors,184 which are derived from 
international criminal law. These prohibitions on the conduct of non-state 
actors may then form the basis of a civil cause of action in a domestic 
court in a state that incorporates customary international law into its 
domestic legal order.185 This forms the basis for a potential universal civil 
liability for breaches of those norms of customary international law that 
touch and concern the conduct of non-state actors. The resulting 
substantive law should, in theory, be the same in any nation.186 
Therefore, the possibility remains for customary international law to 
have a horizontal effect on civil liability in jurisdictions other than the 
                                                                                                                             
184.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–42 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., 
395 F.3d 932, 972–74 (9th Cir. 2002). ATS suits have involved a wider range of norms of 
customary international law either through the “color of law” doctrine or by linking aiding 
and abetting liability under international criminal law with violations of state norms of 
customary international law. 
185.  It is often said that the ATS gives the federal courts “universal jurisdiction.” 
This means that the federal courts will apply a substantive law that is based on violations 
of the law of nations—i.e., of customary international law. However, while substantive law 
involves the application of peremptory norms, this does not mean that the U.S. federal 
courts must hear these claims. The history of ATS litigation is littered with challenges to 
jurisdiction based on various grounds of abstention, such as forum non conveniens, political 
question, act of state, comity, and sovereign immunity. In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. 
Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002), Judge Rakoff stated:  
Accordingly, even if one assumes for the sake of argument the hypothesis that 
Texaco participated in a violation of international law that would support the claim 
here brought under the ATCA, neither that assumption nor any of the other 
considerations special to these cases materially alters the balance of private and 
public interest factors that, as previously discussed, ‘tilt[s] strongly in favor of trial 
in the foreign forum,’ [internal citation omitted] and, indeed, virtually mandates 
dismissal in favor of Ecuador or, if any plaintiff prefers, Peru. 
 
Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
186.  Khulumani v. Barclays National Bank, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). According to Judge Schiendlin, “[i]deally, the outcome of an ATCA case should not 
differ from the result that would be reached under analogous jurisdictional provisions in 
foreign nations such as Belgium, Canada, or Spain.” Id. 
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U.S., where the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel as to the territorial 
limits of the ATS is likely to curtail the viability of such suits in future. 
If foreign courts are to develop such a universal civil liability, they 
will have to grapple with the six issues as to the shape of international 
criminal law that have occupied the U.S. federal courts in ATS cases over 
the last decade. In particular, they will have to determine whether 
international law authorizes states to impose civil liability on 
corporations that commit international crimes, either as principals or as 
aiders and abetters. 
In determining this issue, a domestic court could go one of two ways. 
It could determine that customary international law provides the 
prohibitive norms and that it is then left to each state to determine how 
to apply them within their domestic legal order. Domestic law would then 
determine the issue of corporate liability. This is the approach taken by 
Judge Leval in Kiobel187 and by Judge Posner in Flomo.188 Alternatively, 
courts could adopt the view expressed by the majority of the Second 
Circuit in Kiobel—that corporations cannot incur civil liability for 
violations of customary international law that constitute international 
crimes, because only natural persons can be prosecuted for international 
crimes.189 
It is quite likely that if other jurisdictions were to admit actions 
based on violations of international criminal law, this theoretical 
uniformity would soon split, with different jurisdictions giving different 
decisions as to whether corporations could be liable190 and also as to the 
mens rea for aiding and abetting. The development of a universal civil 
cause of action would have to be led by lawyers in human rights cases 
seeing an advantage in advancing their claims on this basis, rather than 
pleading them as conventional tort cases.191 It remains to be seen 
                                                                                                                             
187.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 173–76 (2d Cir. 2010). 
188.  Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011).  
189.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–37.This approach would still leave open the possibility 
that individual corporate officials could incur civil liability for conduct constituting an 
international crime. 
190.  This is already evidenced by the circuit split on this issue in the U.S. federal 
courts. Corporate liability also raises problems of attribution—which corporate officials do 
we look to when determining issues of “knowing assistance” or “purposive assistance?” 
International criminal law can give us no answer to this question, as from Nuremberg to 
the International Criminal Court, corporations have never been susceptible to proceedings 
before international criminal tribunals. To answer this question we would either have to 
look to some domestic law, such as the lexfori or the lex loci delicti or the lex loci societatis. 
This would lead to different outcomes on liability depending on the rules of corporate 
attribution in the jurisdiction in which the action was brought. 
191.  Under English law a cause of action based on reliance on customary 
international law may yield a substantive advantage over a straightforward tort claim; and 
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whether lawyers outside the U.S. will pick up the baton of pleading 
claims on this basis, or whether the horizontal effect of the law of nations 
will prove to be a purely U.S. phenomenon that ended with Kiobel. 
 
                                                                                                                             
that is in respect of aiding and abetting. A claim against a secondary party has to be on the 
basis that it is a joint tortfeasor. A party who knowingly facilitates a wrong committed by 
another will not be jointly liable.  
Mere facilitation of the commission of a tort by another does not make the 
defendant a joint tortfeasor and there is no tort of ‘knowing assistance’ nor any 
direct counterpart of the criminal law concept of aiding and abetting: the defendant 
must either procure the wrongful act or act in furtherance of a common design or be 
party to a conspiracy. 
 
 W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 21.2 (18th ed. 2010).  
 However, with aiding and abetting an international crime it is arguable that the mens 
rea is one of knowing assistance rather than intentional assistance. 
 
 
